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ABSTRACT
In this paper I discuss the scientific respectability of delusion as a psychiatric category. First, 
I present the essentialist objection to the natural kindhood of psychiatric categories, as well 
as non-essentialism about natural kinds as a response to that objection. Second, I present a 
nuanced classification of kinds of kinds. Third, drawing on the claim that the attribution of 
delusion relies on a folk psychological underpinning, I present the mind-dependence objec-
tion to the natural kind status of delusion. Finally, I argue that even if delusion as a generic 
kind stands little chance of being vindicated as a non-essentialist natural kind, we stand to 
gain from a natural kind methodology regarding subtypes of delusion for which there is 
evidence of genuine causal signatures and mechanisms.
Keywords: delusion, folk psychiatry, psychiatry.
RESUMO
Nesse artigo avalio a respeitabilidade do delírio enquanto categoria psiquiátrica—um esta-
tuto que é discutivelmente colocado em perigo pelo fato de que a detecção e a atribuição 
do delírio parecem se derivar não da classificação causal, mas sim da aplicação do que 
podemos chamar ‘psiquiatria do senso comum’ (folk psychiatry). Primeiramente, examino 
a questão de se tipos psiquiátricos, como um todo, atendem às demandas requeridas para 
que um tipo seja uma distinção objetiva na natureza. Introduzo um sentido liberal no qual 
espécies biológicas, bem como categorias psiquiátricas, podem ser vistas como tipos natu-
rais—a saber, o modelo de agrupamentos homeostáticos de propriedades. Subsequente-
mente, apresento e avalio como modelos da detecção e atribuição de transtornos mentais 
podem ter impacto mesmo sobre uma compreensão liberal do delírio como um tipo na-
tural. Finalmente, concluo argumentando em favor de uma compreensão da categoria do 
delírio em geral como um tipo da psicologia do senso comum recomendando, por sua vez, 
uma metodologia de tipos naturais para a investigação de subtipos de delírio.
Palavras-chave: delírio, psiquiatria do senso comum, psiquiatria.
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Introduction
Delusion is defined by the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) 
as a ‘false belief based on incorrect inference about external 
reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else 
believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and 
obvious proof or evidence to the contrary’ (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2013, p. 819). Predictably, a great variety 
of phenomena are apt to be grouped under such a definition. 
Indeed, people who are deemed to be clinically delusional af-
firm many different things in many different contexts. Here 
are some of them (Davies and Coltheart, 2000, p. 1): 
  ‘My closest relatives have been replaced by impostors.’ 
 ‘I am dead.’
  I am being followed around by people who are known 
to me but who are unrecognizable because they are in 
disguise.’ 
 The person in the mirror is not really me.’ 
  A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospi-
tal ward today.’ 
  This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine, it is 
yours; you have three arms.’ 
 ‘Someone else is able to control my thoughts.’ 
  ‘Someone else’s thoughts are being inserted into my 
mind.’2
What follows is an investigation about our warrant for 
grouping such disparate phenomena together. My primary 
aim is to assess the prospects for a unified theory of delusion 
through the examination of the scientific respectability of 
this psychiatric category—a status which is arguably put in 
jeopardy by the fact that the detection and attribution of de-
lusion seem to stem not from causal classification but from 
the application of what we may call ‘folk psychiatry’. I will 
do so by first introducing the philosophical notion of natu-
ral kind and examining the question of whether psychiatric 
kinds as a whole meet the demands required for a kind to be 
an objective, mind-independent distinction in nature. I will 
then introduce a liberal sense in which biological taxa as well 
as psychiatric categories might be viewed as natural kinds—
namely, the homeostatic property cluster model. Subsequently, I 
will introduce and assess how models of the detection and at-
tribution of mental disorder may impact even a liberal under-
standing of delusion as a natural kind. Finally, I will conclude 
by making a case for a folk-psychological understanding of 
‘delusion’ in general while also recommending a natural-kind 
methodology for the investigation of subtypes of delusion. 
Essentialism
Are mental disorders real? In philosophical jargon, one 
of the main theoretical challenges for psychiatry is to deter-
mine whether the kinds it investigates are natural. Psychiatry’s 
scientific credentials came under heavy criticism in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s—the most radical embodiment of which was rep-
resented by the so-called anti-psychiatry movement, which 
questioned whether mental disorder represents the patholo-
gizing of normal problems of living. Thomas Szasz, the father 
of anti-psychiatry, argued not only that mental disorder as a 
kind fails to pick a real distinction in nature, but that it is just 
a ‘convenient myth’ (1961, p. 113). This intuition is reinforced 
by controversies such as that over the recent removal of the 
“bereavement exclusion” in the diagnosis of depression in the 
DSM-5. Likewise the proposed addition of ‘persistent com-
plex bereavement disorder’ in an attempt to classify those who 
are significantly impaired by prolonged grief symptoms for at 
least one month after six months of bereavement (Zachar, 
2015). Against the backdrop of challenges to the validity of 
psychiatric classifications as a whole, the task is to make clear 
the basis on which conditions are included or excluded from 
the manuals and why this basis is scientific and objective and 
not just a matter of social rules of normal behavior (Bolton, 
2008, p. 164). If entities classified as mental disorders could 
be shown to be natural kinds, then many of the controversies 
surrounding the status of psychiatry as a serious scientific en-
deavor could be resolved. However, this will depend on what 
exactly one takes natural kinds to be. 
What are natural kinds? What characteristics must a 
kind have in order for it to be considered a natural kind? The 
traditional account of natural kinds is represented by various 
forms of essentialism which date back to the Aristotelian tra-
dition, in which essences had both causal and classificatory 
(or sortal) roles. The causal role referred to the underlying 
properties that determined and sustained an instance’s vis-
ible properties. Because these underlying properties were 
supposed to be fixed, they were identified with the nature of 
a kind—that which makes it be what it is. After the rise of 
natural philosophy in the seventeenth century, the essential 
hidden properties which Locke called ‘real essences’ came to 
be identified with underlying structural properties which, he 
argued, are not observable.3
As Marc Ereshefsky (2009) observes, essentialism usu-
ally involves three main tenets: first, all and only the members 
of a kind share a common essence; second, that essence is a 
property, or a set of properties, that all the members of a kind 
must have; and third, a kind’s essence causes the other proper-
ties associated with that kind. So, for example, the essence of 
2 These examples pertain to eight different subtypes of clinical delusion, respectively: Capgras delusion, Cotard delusion, Frégoli delu-
sion, mirrored-self misidentification, reduplicative paramnesia, somatoparaphrenia, thought control, and thought insertion. See Radden 
(2011) and Porcher (2016) for a more in-depth introduction to delusion.
3 It is fair to say that Locke underestimated the kinds of observation that technology would eventually allow us to make of properties 
which are potentially essential, such as the number of protons in the nucleus of an atom, or the genetic code in specific DNA sequences.
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gold is gold’s atomic structure, and that atomic structure oc-
curs in all and only pieces of gold. That structure is a property 
that all gold must have as opposed to such accidental proper-
ties as being valuable to humans. And the atomic structure 
of gold causes pieces of gold to have the properties associated 
with that kind, such as readily dissolving in mercury at room 
temperature, conducting heat and electricity, and being unaf-
fected by air and moisture.
The reason why it matters for the development of a sci-
ence whether its kinds are natural in the sense of picking out 
essential distinctions has to do with the fact that such kinds 
will be ideally suited to figure in key scientific practices such 
as induction, explanation, classification, and discovery. Natu-
ral kinds pick out classes about which non-accidental, scien-
tifically relevant, inductive generalizations can be formulated, 
since its members share many non-accidentally related prop-
erties. The reliably co-varying clustering of properties that 
instances of natural kinds possess is, however, contingent (as 
opposed to logically or conceptually necessary) and its exis-
tence calls out for explanation, usually undertaken through 
the identification and specification of the structures, process-
es, and mechanisms that causally explain the property clus-
ters associated with the kind under consideration. 
In other words, one’s ability to make inferences about 
members of a natural kind is explained with reference to their 
shared underlying properties. Being some such natural kind 
explains why an instance of that kind has the features that it 
does, and that explanation is to be found in studying the in-
trinsic underlying properties an instance shares with other in-
stances of that kind. Furthermore, with respect to the classifi-
catory role, if one can identify the essence of a thing, one may 
be able to determine its place in the natural order. According 
to essentialism, if you want to know whether something is a 
true member of a natural kind, you should check whether the 
causally essential underlying properties are present, as such 
properties will invariably be necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for membership in a natural kind. Thus, essentialism 
implies that there is a correct classification of naturally oc-
curring kinds out there waiting to be discovered. As the phil-
osophical adage goes, nature is such that it can be “carved at 
its joints.” 
Besides figuring in the practices of generalization, ex-
planation, classification, and discovery, Richard Samuels 
(2009) points out three further characteristics that flow from 
natural-kindhood as necessary conditions for the scientif-
ic respectability of any given kind. Given that natural kinds 
possess a sortal essence,4 they will be discrete classes of enti-
ties that can be clearly demarcated from other phenomena 
and they will be highly homogeneous classes as well. Moreover, 
natural kinds will be mind-independent in an important sense,5 
which Sam Page (2006) calls individuative independence, name-
ly, that of being circumscribed by boundaries that are totally 
independent of how we categorize things. Page illustrates his 
concept by alluding to the individuation of the night sky into 
constellations: ‘Though it is prima facie plausible that reality is 
individuated intrinsically into stars, reality is not individuated 
intrinsically into constellations, since it is people who divide 
the night sky into constellations’ (2006, p. 328). 
Essentialism about psychiatric kinds—the view that psy-
chiatric disorders are (or at any rate should be) akin to stars, 
not constellations—is associated with the biomedical model 
of psychiatry, which proposes that psychiatric kinds can and 
should be isolated by studying underlying biopathological pro-
cesses. Jerome Wakefield’s (1992) harmful dysfunction model, 
arguably the most influential philosophical theory about the 
nature of mental disorder, recognizes the claims of Szasz and 
others concerning the evaluative nature of psychiatric diag-
nosis without thereby abandoning realism about psychiatric 
disorders. Wakefield argues that the presence or absence of a 
dysfunction is a factual matter, just as the presence or absence 
of a natural function is. Since natural functions were selected 
for during evolution because of their contribution to the sur-
vival of the organism, evaluative statements about functions 
(and, hence, dysfunctions) can be translated into objective, 
factual statements about evolutionary history. To qualify as a 
“disorder,” however, Wakefield acknowledges that there must 
also be evidence that the condition in question is harmful to 
its bearer—and this will be an inherently evaluative, norma-
tively assessable aspect of all judgments of pathology. 
Given the present stage of development of biological 
psychiatry, however, the essences of the dysfunctions that 
constitute psychiatric disorders—alongside the evaluative 
aspect of suffering or impairment—are yet to be discovered, 
just as the essence of electrons and gold once were. Until the 
necessary scientific discoveries are made, their essences are, so 
to speak, in a black box. As Peter Zachar explains, Wakefield’s 
(2004) black-box essentialism follows the scenario proposed 
by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke wherein, at some point 
4 As Samuels (2009, p. 57) uses the term, sortal essences consist of intrinsic properties and, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, 
they are possessed by all and only the members of the kind. Causal essences, on the other hand, do not imply these commitments, 
and are simply the set of properties that figure in causal explanations of a given kind. So all sortal essences are causal essences but 
not vice versa.
5 Following Page (2006), Samuels (2009, p. 53-54) identifies three possible senses of mind-independence that do not flow from natu-
ral-kindhood and are, therefore, irrelevant to the characterization of natural kinds. The first is that attached to theoretical entities (e.g. 
quarks, electrical fields, and chemical compounds), which should not be considered trivially mind-dependent, non-natural kinds. The 
second is that attached to entities whose existence metaphysically necessitates the existence of minds, such as psychological kinds 
as beliefs, desires, delusions, etc. and, again, should not be considered trivially non-natural. Finally, and perhaps more controversially, 
Samuels rejects the relevance of causal dependence on mental activity, which is true of such kinds as toy poodles and the radioactive 
chemical element californium, as he argues that this feature should not trivially imply that such kinds are not “natural” in the scientifically 
relevant sense (i.e. though not naturally-occurring, they may nevertheless turn out to figure in all relevant scientific practices).
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in history, there occurs a “baptismal” event in which, in the 
example at hand, a disorder is clinically observed and named: 
“‘This is psychopathy,’ said Hervey Cleckley (1941). ‘This is 
autism,’ said Leo Kanner (1935). If the original disorder con-
cept can be developed into a proper scientific construct (one 
based on an objective dysfunction), the clinician’s original 
concept can be said to have indirectly referred to the objective 
dysfunction all along” (Zachar, 2014b, p. 83-84). 
Note, however, with respect to the aforementioned con-
ditions for the scientific respectability of a given kind, that bi-
ological taxa such as species appear to meet all of them and, 
still, they are widely regarded as failing to constitute essential-
istic natural kinds6 as do chemical kinds such as ascorbic acid 
and H
2
O, and physical kinds such as quark and lenticular gal-
axy. This is the case because, as the first tenet of essentialism 
requires, for a biological trait to be the essence of a species that 
trait must occur in all and only the members of that species. 
However, as Ereshefsky (2001, p. 98) points out, a number of 
biological forces work against the uniqueness and universality 
of a trait in any given species. For example, suppose a genet-
ically-based trait were found in all the members of a species, 
such as the unique genetic code of lemons that Putnam (1975) 
speculates is the essence of lemons. The forces of non-adap-
tive causes of evolution such as mutation and genetic drift 
can cause the disappearance of that trait in a future member 
of the species. Furthermore, as Ereshefsky observes, even if a 
trait occurred in all the members of a species, that trait would 
be the essence of a species only if it were unique to that spe-
cies. But organisms of different species often have common 
traits because they inherit similar genes and developmental 
resources from common ancestors. Therefore, given the re-
quirements of essentialism and the forces of evolution, essen-
tialism about biological kinds has been widely rejected.7
If biological kinds are not amenable to conceptualization 
as natural kinds, then what chance do psychiatric kinds stand 
of successfully being characterized as such? Zachar (2000) 
argues that conceptualizing psychiatric disorders as bound-
ed entities in nature is inconsistent with evolutionary biolo-
gy’s understanding of species. Indeed, as Nick Haslam (2014, 
p. 11) notes, psychiatric classification would be a great deal 
easier if its diagnostic entities were like biological species, 
since, while the process of demarcating biological taxa rests 
on the scientifically impeccable confidence that naturally oc-
curring biological kinds exist, the taxonomic situation in psy-
chiatry is very different, as mental disorders do not pick out 
distinct, reproductively isolated, spatially concentrated pop-
ulations. Moreover, while biological species are “indifferent”, 
at least some mental disorders seem to be “interactive kinds” 
(Hacking, 1999), since those who are classified are often 
aware of being labeled and may come to change their behavior 
and self-experience in consequence of such awareness, thus 
producing a “looping effect” whereby the labels may change in 
virtue of their subjects changing (Hacking, 2007). 
Furthermore, in stark contrast to their biological coun-
terparts, psychiatric kinds (and kinds of people more generally) 
tend to be at least partly shaped by social processes and nor-
mative concerns. These considerations are the motivating force 
behind the anti-essentialist argument in philosophy of psychi-
atry. As we will see, the cogency of this argument will depend 
on how exactly one should understand ‘essence’, as essentialism 
about natural kinds has been challenged in recent years (Boyd, 
1991). Also, it will depend on the plausibility of the repudiation 
of pluralism—the view that different psychiatric kinds differ in 
how much they fail to meet the criteria for natural-kindhood 
(Haslam, 2002)—the acceptance of which would in principle 
keep open the possibility that at least some mental disorders 
might have essences. For now, however, I will assume that the 
general argument is cogent in order to consider what may be 
proposed instead to properly capture the features of psychiatric 
kinds, noting that by assuming that they are not natural kinds 
one is not immediately committed to the view that they are 
non-kinds (pace Szasz). Following a nuanced classification of 
kinds of kinds, such as that offered by Haslam (2014), will go a 
long way toward disabusing one of the notion that distinctions 
proper must be essential or fail to be real distinctions at all. His 
schematic account is based on five kinds of kinds that satisfy 
increasingly stringent criteria, each successive kind of kind hav-
ing to meet one more requirement, with proper natural kinds 
being on the top of the ladder. 
In what follows, I will go over the different kinds of kinds 
that fall short of being distinguishable by a category essence: 
dimensions, practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, and discrete kinds. I 
will connect these notions to the discussion of natural kind-
hood in the philosophy of psychiatry, as well as to the more 
general discussion of the proper way to characterize natural 
kinds, within which the most widely adopted view states that 
natural kinds should not be conceptualized essentialistically, 
but in terms of property clusters sustained by complex, mutu-
ally reinforcing networks of causal mechanisms.
Non-essentialism
The first kind of kind and the least demanding struc-
ture in Haslam’s classification is what he refers to as dimensions 
(strictly speaking a non-kind, since they do not define delim-
6 From now on, I drop ‘essentialistic’ as always refer to natural kinds in the essentialistic sense unless otherwise noted. As we will see 
below, the term ‘natural kind’ has been re-appropriated by authors who believe that essentialism is too stringent, while believing that 
less stringent criteria can properly characterize kinds as ‘natural’ (Boyd, 1991).
7 Three main views have been advanced in response to this: denying that species are natural kinds and looking elsewhere in biology for 
kinds with essences (Hull, 1978); arguing that species are indeed kinds with essences, but that their essences are of a non-traditional 
variety (Okasha, 2002); and, as we will see below, arguing that natural kinds do not require the sort of essences implied by essentialism 
(Boyd, 1999).
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ited categories). The label comes from the standard categori-
cal/dimensional distinction in psychopathology research and 
theory, motivated by the categories of personality disorder 
which, perhaps more than any other current DSM category, 
do not seem to be distinct species (Clark et al., 1995; Livesley, 
2003; Widiger and Sanderson, 1995). For instance, in the in-
fluential model introduced by John Livesley, once the patho-
logical dimensions have been identified—which may include 
narcissism, impulsivity, anxiousness, social detachment, and 
hostility (Widiger et al., 2009)—patients meeting criteria for 
a broad category called ‘personality disorder’ are distinguished 
from one another by their respective position on the dimen-
sions. To qualify as a dimension, all that is required for a kind 
is that there be a set of correlated properties, such as symp-
toms. As Haslam puts it, “Individuals may differ by degree 
along a dimension by possessing greater or lesser numbers 
or degrees of these properties. Variation along a dimension 
is continuous and seamless, so there is no naturally occurring 
break separating individuals who are affected with a condi-
tion from those who are not” (2014, p. 14). In other words, 
if psychiatric kinds were dimensions, this would amount to 
there not being delimited conditions at all. A cutpoint would 
be defined on the dimension so that the quantitative varia-
tion would be simplified into a dichotomous diagnosis, but its 
placement would ultimately be arbitrary. 
Thus, proponents of dimensional models of psychopa-
thology hold that the distribution of variation on psychopa-
thology-related dimensions is continuous in the same sense as 
what philosophers refer to as vague predicates. These models 
are devised in response to the limitations of the purely cate-
gorical approach, such as the failure to capture individual dif-
ferences in disorder severity, and clinically significant features 
subsumed by other disorders or falling below conventional 
DSM thresholds (Brown and Barlow, 2005). Nevertheless, 
while rejecting the view that psychiatric kinds are natural 
kinds, Zachar (2000) argues that mental disorders pick out 
reasonably stable, non-arbitrary patterns that can be identi-
fied with varying levels of reliability and validity, and that the 
application of many of the distinctions of psychopathology is 
justified by its usefulness for clinical purposes, being demar-
cated on the basis of external considerations rather than on 
the basis of internal discontinuities. In keeping with these ob-
servations, Zachar proposes that mental disorders be concep-
tualized as practical kinds, the next rung in Haslam’s ladder, 
which refers to the least demanding sort of non-arbitrary cut-
point—that of pragmatically-grounded distinctions.8
As an example from outside the field of psychiatry, Zach-
ar (2014b, p. 154-155) alludes to the distinction between an 
adult and a child. Although the kinds ‘adult’ and ‘child’ are not 
in themselves sharply demarcated, the uses for which we de-
ploy them will determine where their boundaries should be 
drawn. Consequently, many distinctions between adults and 
children are context-dependent. For example, if our aim is to 
decide who is able to vote, engage in consensual sex, get mar-
ried, be sent to prison, drink alcohol, or enter into a legal con-
tract, each of those considerations will result in different ways 
of demarcating adulthood (Horwitz and Wakefield, 2012, 
p. 53). As medical examples of non-arbitrary cutpoints on 
continuous dimensions, Haslam (2014, p. 14) points out 
blood pressure values for diagnosing hypertension and Body 
Mass Index values for diagnosing obesity—values that rough-
ly correspond to levels at which health risks become more 
likely. When at some point along a dimension the severity 
of the relevant symptoms becomes clinically significant or a 
source of functional impairment, the existence of a non-arbi-
trary, pragmatic distinction is justified. 
So practical kinds, while vaguer than natural kinds, are 
not open to the charge of arbitrariness as dimensions are (at 
least as these are conceptualized in Haslam’s model). The 
classification of practical kinds requires balancing criteria 
that do change their values in different contexts depending 
on treatment goals, research priorities, and disciplinary stan-
dards of validity. As a consequence, practical kinds fall short 
of possessing the perfect reliability one may be justified to ex-
pect from natural kinds. Relating the practical kinds model to 
his claim that psychiatric nosology is inherently goal-orient-
ed, Zachar has recently elaborated on the dynamics of classi-
fication within his model, observing that it emphasizes that 
discovery of fact contributes greatly to progress in classifica-
tion, but that discovery alone cannot tell us how to classify.
For example, discovering that a mild form of cognitive 
disorganization (schizotypy) is common in families of people 
with schizophrenia was an important finding that highlighted 
an objective feature of the world. Should schizotypy, therefore, 
be classified as a mild manifestation of a unitary schizophren-
ic spectrum (a genetic grouping)? Another possibility is that it 
should be classified as a premorbid personality style that rep-
resents a vulnerability to the mental illness of schizophrenia. In 
which box should it be placed? (Zachar, 2014, p. 90). Zachar’s 
point is that, apart from goals relating to classification and 
theory-building, neither demarcation is privileged in and of 
itself. 
The presence of goal-oriented cutpoints raises the ques-
tion of whether practical kinds are apt to count as scientif-
ically relevant kinds, and this, in turn, raises the question of 
what the minimal criteria of scientifically-relevant kindhood 
should be. Zachar defers to Nelson Goodman, who did not 
advocate for natural kinds or scientific realism, but instead 
offered a theory of relevant kinds. With respect to the criteria 
for relevance, according to Goodman, good scientific kinds 
support induction (to a greater or lesser degree) or, as he would 
later put it, they have properties that are “projectible,” meaning 
8 Though, as we will see later, Zachar’s most recent proposal acknowledges the middle way between practical kinds and essentialism 
about natural kinds embodied in Richard Boyd’s property-cluster approach, going so far as to state that Boyd’s model is probably the 
most appropriate for conceptualizing most psychiatric disorders (Zachar, 2014a, p. 94).
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that if we observe certain properties in a subset of a kind, we 
can infer that these properties will occur in other instances of 
the same kind, allowing us to confirm generalizations about 
that kind (Goodman, 1978, 1983). Let us assume, for the sake 
of the argument, that projectibility is a good enough criterion 
of relevance. Do psychiatric kinds support induction? Even 
though present classifications of mental disorders are high-
ly variable with respect to validity, and in spite of diagnosis 
being presently based on polythetic categories, research on 
mental disorder has been able to produce many useful gener-
alizations. The question is whether these generalizations are 
based on (at least some) psychiatric kinds being held together 
by shared causal mechanisms or if they are based solely on the 
shared surface features of such kinds (meaning that they are 
merely practical kinds). 
The practical kinds model is implicit in the symp-
tom-based nosologies of current diagnostic manuals which 
aim at grouping patients into useful classes that serve practi-
cal goals (such as predicting behavior, assessing genetic risk, or 
selecting a course of treatment). This grouping, effective as it 
may be, does not require that diagnoses be grounded in shared 
causal processes. On the other hand, the assumed causal het-
erogeneity of psychiatric kinds does not immediately imply 
that they cannot be causally classified. Note, however, that as 
the existence of shared causal mechanisms underlying men-
tal disorders is currently an open question, assuming that a 
causal classification of psychiatric kinds is tenable is another 
instance of a black box approach (as with Wakefield’s harmful 
dysfunction model. Nevertheless, as Kendler et al. (2011) ar-
gue, by focusing solely on the adjustments and compromises 
that actually occur in classification, the practical kinds mod-
el fails to suggest a way toward progress. In other words, the 
model is purely descriptive of the current state of psychiat-
ric classifications. If progress is to be made, linking disorders 
to their etiology and underlying mechanisms is indubitably 
psychiatry’s best bet. For this reason, psychiatry may profit 
from conceptualizing its kinds in a way that goes beyond the 
merely pragmatic and assumes internal (but not necessarily 
external) discontinuities. To this end, we may climb one more 
rung in Haslam’s ladder, toward a more ambitious model. 
Dimensions and practical kinds both represent forms of 
continuous variation. According to Haslam, such variation 
becomes categorical in a deeper sense when there exists some 
sort of internal discontinuity within a kind which cannot 
be accounted for by pragmatic considerations alone: ‘Such a 
discontinuity involves a break on the underlying continuum, 
which produces a qualitative distinction between people who 
fall above the discontinuity and those who fall below it. An 
example is a threshold effect, in which a qualitative change 
of state occurs at a certain point on an underlying continu-
um (e.g., a liquid turning to a gas at a certain temperature, or 
a spring losing its tension beyond its elastic limit)’ (Haslam, 
2014, p. 15). When internal discontinuities within a kind are 
present but are not sharp, we have what Haslam calls fuzzy 
kinds. Within these, then, kind membership will not always 
be definite: there will be a penumbra of intermediate cases 
between those that are definitely members of the kind and 
those that are definitely not. 
On the other hand, when internal discontinuities are 
sharp but no set of essential properties exists, we step up 
Haslam’s ladder once again to find what he calls discrete kinds. 
In this kind of kind we have what may properly be called a 
category boundary. However, Haslam points out that discrete 
kinds may have a variety of possible causal underpinnings, as 
many types of causal explanation can yield category bound-
aries: ‘These causal explanation types include sharp thresh-
old effects (where the qualitative change of state is abrupt), 
dynamic interactions of multiple causal factors, and expla-
nations that invoke centripetal tendencies within categories 
(e.g., conscious identification with a group or label) and/or 
differentiating tendencies’ (2014, p. 15). This immediately 
makes discrete kinds excellent candidates for scientific re-
spectability in the eyes of those who argue that scientific prac-
tice does not require an essence in the traditional sense of a 
micro-structural property that explains all the other proper-
ties of a kind while also being unique to that kind. 
Indeed, both fuzzy and discrete kinds are candidates for 
natural kindhood if one refuses to accept that what makes a 
kind a natural kind is its possession of an essence, rather than 
its utility in induction and other scientific practices. Within 
the non-essentialist kinds-in-science tradition (Cooper, 2013), 
fuzzy, discrete, and essentialistic natural kinds are all prop-
er subsets of inductively useful kinds.9 Within this tradition, 
several accounts of kinds have been developed with the aim 
of explaining how it is that kinds like biological species—in 
which there simply are no essential properties to be found—
can successfully ground explanations and inductive infer-
ences. Insofar as the most ambitious sense in which psychi-
atric kinds might turn out to be natural is the same in which 
biological kinds are taken to be natural, such accounts of 
kindhood are of particular interest for the conceptualization 
of mental disorders as something belonging between practical 
kinds and kinds with essences.
John Dupré (1981, 1993) argues for promiscuous realism 
—the view that there are countless, yet legitimate ways of di-
viding up the world into kinds. He asks us to consider the en-
tities of some domain mapped into a multidimensional space 
wherein the different dimensions map onto different prop-
erties, as in cluster analysis—a statistical method for group-
ing sets of objects based on their similarities, in such a way 
9 Though the history of natural kind thought is usually traced back to Locke’s real essences (Boyd, 1991), Murphy (2006, p. 335, 
fn. 6) notes that, as a historical precedent for the kinds-in-science tradition, Hacking (1991) argues that the notion of natural kinds 
indubitably surfaces in Mill and Venn in the mid-nineteenth century in connection with induction—something which did not preoccu-
py philosophers before Hume.
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that objects in the same cluster are more similar to each other 
than to those in other clusters. According to Dupré, biological 
species—as well as higher taxa such as families and kingdoms, 
and lower ranks such as subspecies and varieties—would be 
identified with some such clusters. His realism has to do with 
the fact that he accepts that the world possesses individuals 
which are objectively similar to each other, sharing properties 
and, thus, being identifiable as being of the same kind. The 
promiscuity of Dupré’s realism, on the other hand, has to do 
with the fact that he denies that these properties are intrin-
sic properties of kinds and, in line with Haslam’s concept of 
fuzzy kinds, he argues that natural kinds are not necessarily 
categorically distinct (i.e., they are not necessarily discrete 
kinds). Moreover, such taxonomic promiscuity is reflected on 
our classificatory practices both in the context of common 
sense and within science. 
In the context of common sense, a (presumed) natural 
kind such as lilies is classified as a flower, although, in biology, 
species which are commonly referred to as lilies occur in nu-
merous genera of the lily family (Liliaceae), including bulbs 
such as garlic and onions. However, as Dupré observes, to in-
clude the onions and garlics in the reference of the English 
word ‘lily’ would surely amount to a debasement of the term 
(1981, p. 74). The moral is that common sense and biology 
provide us with pluralistic ways of classifying lilies and each 
is equally legitimate depending on our interests. This is not 
to say that Dupré’s kinds are merely practical—it means that 
his conception of natural kinds takes seriously the different 
classifications that arise from a variety of interests. Indeed, 
cross-classification sometimes occurs within the context of a 
single science, to which the countless ways of classifying spe-
cies bear witness (Dupré, 1993, p. 38). 
By denying that there is one unique way of demarcating 
the set of natural kinds, Richard Boyd (1991, 1999) endors-
es promiscuous realism. Furthermore, by emphasizing that 
members of a kind share properties for a reason, his homeo-
static property cluster (HPC) account elaborates on Dupré’s 
idea. In a near-consensus in recent philosophy of science, the 
HPC account has been widely seen not only as the most suc-
cessful approach to make sense of the intuitive natural-kind-
hood of biological species, but as quite simply the best account 
of natural-kindhood (Samuels and Ferreira, 2010). The HPC 
model defers to the kinds-in-science tradition by stating that 
natural kinds are scientifically relevant kinds and that these 
are, at a minimum, fuzzy sets defined by homeostatic10 mech-
anisms at multiple levels that act and interact to produce the 
key properties associated with the kind. These mechanisms 
are the reason why members of a kind are, and continue to be, 
alike. Importantly, they are also the reason why the clusters 
of phenomena identifiable as being of the same kind are sim-
ilar enough to be subject to explanation in terms of the same 
underlying causal properties. Thus, Dominic Murphy (2006, 
p. 338) refers to Boyd’s account as a refined form of essen-
tialism, since homeostatic properties substitute and play the 
same role of what in “simple” essentialism constituted the es-
sence of a kind (namely, micro-structural properties). By not 
insisting on necessary properties or a single, essential cause, 
and by not specifying that such a cause must be biological, 
the HPC account is clearly broader than simple essentialism 
and advances a much more liberal sense of natural-kindhood. 
So Boyd’s natural kinds are, minimally, fuzzy kinds. 
In cluster-analytic terms, if the members of different fuzzy 
kinds whose members share a certain number of properties 
are plotted in a multi-dimensional space, there will not al-
ways be a clear gap between them. As Haslam (2014, p. 18) 
notes, since homeostatic mechanisms merely produce cor-
relations among properties and resemblance among entities 
that possess those properties, there is no reason to assume 
that similarity-generating mechanisms will always yield 
sharp discontinuities between entities that possess sufficient 
levels or numbers of those properties and entities that do not. 
This leads Carl Craver (2009) to conclude that HPC kinds 
have a prototype or family-resemblance structure. Note, how-
ever, that both discrete and essentialistic kinds are also proper 
subsets of the set of HPC kinds, so that Boyd’s account ac-
commodates the intuitively plausible possibility that there are 
different levels of natural-kindhood—in Haslam’s five-tier 
classification, these levels comprise all kinds for which there 
are internal discontinuities independent of our interests. In 
this way, some scientifically relevant kinds may turn out to 
be fuzzy, others discrete, and still others may turn out to have 
essences. For example, membership in the kinds encompassed 
by chemical elements may be essentially defined by the num-
ber of protons found in the nucleus of an atom. This is part of 
the appeal of Boyd’s account, since there is no reason to think 
that psychiatric disorders, biological species, and chemical el-
ements must pertain to the same kind of kind, and, according 
to the kinds-in-science tradition, there is also no reason to 
deny natural-kind status to non-essentialistic kinds as a mat-
ter of principle. 
The inductive potential of HPC kinds is underwritten 
by the fact that if properties are held together homeostatical-
ly, then we will be able to conclude on the basis of one prop-
erty that others will typically occur with it. Boyd’s focus on 
the underlying causal mechanisms that make homeostasis 
possible is important for the present investigation because it 
ties the HPC model to causal explanation and classification 
which, as we have seen, is absent from the practical kinds 
model—the main competing model of psychiatric kinds. As 
Samuels notes, for any homeostatic property cluster ‘there 
is some set of empirically discoverable causal mechanisms, 
processes, structures, and constraints—a causal essence, if you 
will—that causally explains the co-variation of these various 
symptoms’ (2009, p. 55). Therefore, kind-membership will be 
10 Homeostasis being the property of a system or mechanism by which variables are regulated so that internal conditions remain stable 
and relatively constant.
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defined not by sets of co-occurring properties or symptoms, 
as mental disorders are presently demarcated in diagnostic 
manuals such as DSM-5, but by the set of causal mechanisms 
that make these properties occur together. On the other 
hand, psychiatric conditions could satisfy the requirements of 
an HPC kind even if the boundary separating the affected in-
dividuals from the unaffected was fundamentally ambiguous 
and the affected individuals fell on a gradient of prototypical-
ity (Haslam, 2014, p. 18). Partly for this reason, philosophers 
of psychiatry increasingly endorse Boyd’s as the appropriate 
concept of kindhood for psychiatric categories (Beebee and 
Sabbarton-Leary, 2010; Kendler et al., 2011). 
Along these lines, Samuels (2009) provides the first in-
depth discussion of the natural kind status of delusion in par-
ticular. He argues for the view that delusion is a natural kind 
in the liberal HPC sense by skillfully answering various ob-
jections to this view and drawing positive morals from them. 
These objections focus on three characteristics of delusion 
that may be viewed as going against its natural kind status: 
the alleged continuity of delusion with normal experience 
(van Os et al., 2009); the causal, neural, and cognitive hetero-
geneity of delusion (Freeman and Garety, 2006); and, finally, 
the mind-dependence of delusion as a kind (Murphy, 2006). 
Here I will confine myself to the mind-dependence objec-
tions. In the next section, I will set the stage for the discussion 
of the mind-dependence objections by presenting a model of 
our intuitive detection and attribution of mental disorder, 
and an extension of this model that aims at accounting for 
the detection and attribution of delusion in particular. 
Mind-dependence
How do people detect and attribute mental disorders? 
How do culture-specific models of dysfunction influence 
these processes? And how do pan-specific features of human 
minds influence cultural models of detection and attribution? 
As Pascal Boyer (2011) notes, the actual cognitive processes 
engaged in when people think about mental disorder have 
eluded empirical research. He attributes this to the fact that 
such processes fall between the domains of two well-estab-
lished disciplines, namely, cross-cultural psychiatry (which 
focuses on the cultural variation of disorders themselves) and 
anthropological ethnopsychiatry (which focuses on cultural 
models of sanity and madness). Recently, however, Haslam 
and colleagues have, in a series of theoretical and empirical 
papers, developed a social–cognitive model of laypeople’s 
thinking about mental disorder—what they dub folk psychia-
try—which shows promise as an organizing framework for a 
field that has lacked a clear theoretical basis. 
Haslam’s folk psychiatry model specifies four dimen-
sions along which laypeople conceptualize mental disorders: 
pathologizing, that is, the extent to which the observed behav-
ior is construed as abnormal or deviant, mainly on the basis 
of rarity, and as a result of the failure to explain the behavior; 
moralizing, the extent to which the observed behavior is un-
der the subject’s control and to which individuals are morally 
accountable for their abnormality; medicalizing, the extent to 
which the observed behavior has a somatic basis and is the 
direct result of an underlying organic condition; and psychol-
ogizing, the extent to which the observed behavior has a men-
tal, non-intentional basis, and is the direct result of a psycho-
logical dysfunction which shifts the explanatory focus toward 
causes, not reasons, undermining moral judgment (Haslam, 
2003, 2005; Haslam et al., 2007). 
Empirical support for the folk psychiatry model comes 
from a series of studies in which participants rate descrip-
tions of mental disorders and other conditions on a number 
of items that assess features of the model. In the first study 
of this sort, Nick Haslam and Cezar Giosan (2002) inter-
viewed American undergraduates who had no formal edu-
cation in abnormal psychology. They were given the task of 
reading paragraph-length descriptions of 68 conditions, 47 
of which corresponded to DSM-IV mental disorders. They 
were then asked to judge if the conditions were mental disor-
ders and to rate them on 15 items addressing components of 
the concept of mental disorder proposed by several theorists. 
The authors found that American lay understandings un-
derstandings of ‘mental disorder’ showed moderate conver-
gence with the DSM-IV concept of mental disorder. Then, 
in a follow-up study, Giosan et al. (2001) replicated the pilot 
study in student samples from Brazil and Romania using an 
identical research design and carefully translated versions of 
the original questionnaire. The most interesting departure 
from the American understanding of mental disorder was 
found among Brazilian participants, who did not represent 
moralizing and medicalizing as polar opposites, placing them 
on separate factors and thereby justifying the distinctness and 
irreducibility of these dimensions. 
Besides mapping stable understandings of abnormality 
within and across cultures, the folk psychiatry model also 
illuminates shifts in these understandings. Since they found 
earlier that North American understandings of mental dis-
orders tend to be more psychologized or “internalistic” than 
those of Brazilians, Glovsky and Haslam (2003) predicted 
that the longer the period of acculturation of Brazilian citi-
zens living in the United States, the more psychologized their 
understandings of disorders would be compared to their less 
acculturated compatriots. Consistent with this prediction, 
more acculturated participants judged a larger proportion of 
the conditions to be mental disorders. Importantly, they also 
understood these conditions more as manifestations of emo-
tional distress and intrapsychic dysfunction and showed a 
stronger tendency both to understand disorder as a violation 
of social expectations and to pathologize behavior in excess 
(‘acting out’). Therefore, the concept of ‘transtorno mental’ 
they once shared with their Brazilian peers broadened and 
took on a more psychologizing cast among more “American-
ized” Brazilian participants. 
Note, however, that while these studies and the theoret-
ical framework that emerges from them provide an elegant 
illustration of the cognitive processes of intuitive detection 
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at work, they do not address the equally important why and 
how questions about our intuitive detection of mental disor-
der—namely, why and how intuitive folk psychiatries emerge. 
Toward that end, Boyer forges a cognitive model that builds 
on the evidence provided by Haslam and colleagues, as well 
as on observations about the causal connections between 
pathology, cultural context, typical manifestations, popular 
categorization, and scholarly description. In the first stage of 
Boyer’s account, dysfunction triggers behaviors, only some of 
which are detectable as violations of folk psychology—that 
is, the shared assumptions that are the basis of our ability to 
describe, interpret, and predict each other’s behavior by at-
tributing beliefs, desires, hopes, feelings, and other familiar 
mental states. (The ones that are not bounce off intuitive de-
tection.) Importantly, sometimes causes other than dysfunc-
tion will trigger behaviors that will be interpreted as viola-
tions caused by dysfunction, and in these instances detection 
will have gone wrong. Detection of unexpected behavior will 
trigger explanatory causal models for the behavior, not all of 
which make it through cycles of acquisition and communica-
tion (unsuccessful models bounce off transmission). Finally, 
frequently activated models may have feedback effects. These 
affect the models themselves through the work of trans-
mission biases whereby people are more likely to adopt and 
transmit representations that are already widespread (Boyd 
and Richerson, 1985). Moreover, they affect people’s behav-
iors when subjects of classification become aware of being so 
classified. Such changes, in turn, may lead to revisions in the 
initial descriptions of mental disorders (Hacking, 1995). 
For our purposes, what is especially important are the 
first stages in Boyer’s account, which, in short, boil down to the 
claim that our intuitive detection of mental disorder involves 
judging that certain kinds of behavior are so different from our 
expectations that they are taken as evidence that the mental 
systems that produce them are dysfunctional. These are mental 
dispositions that form part of our shared cognitive architecture 
(Sperber, 1996). But just as ‘narratives, scholarship, etiquette, 
politics, cuisine, musical traditions, or religious rituals’ (Boyer, 
2011, p. 112) are culture-specific, the manifestations of these 
dispositions to attribute dysfunction will also be culture-spe-
cific (by deriving from the sets of mental representations that 
constitute the models of what is wrong with people’s behavior 
within specific contexts). While Boyer’s theory is not a theory 
of mental disorder, but a theory of its attribution, his idea of 
mental disorder as a defeater of folk psychology may have an 
important impact on the project of uncovering natural psychi-
atric kinds, including the project of vindicating the natural kind 
status of delusion (Murphy, 2014). 
In the context of a discussion about what he calls the 
‘counterintuitive biology’ inherent in some religious and mag-
ical concepts, Boyer (2001) considers Wendy James’s account 
of ‘ebony divination,’ a practice of the Uduk-speaking peoples 
that she encountered while carrying out fieldwork in the bor-
derlands of Sudan’s frontier with Ethiopia in the 1960s. The 
Uduk report that ebony trees can eavesdrop on conversations 
and that they ‘know of the actions of the arum [souls, spirits, 
including people who were not given a proper burial] and of 
dhatu (witches) and other sources of psychic activity’ ( James, 
1988, p. 303). According to James, diviners perform oracu-
lar consultation by burning ebony wood as a form of seeking 
personal healing and keeping foreign gods at bay. During the 
consultation, the ebony stick will produce specific smudges in 
the water which indicate not only the nature of the problem 
at hand but also a solution. 
In contrast, consider the following case described by 
Murphy: 
Ed was sleeping rough, and heard (or, had 
the experience of) a tree in a park tell him 
that the park was a good place to stay. So 
Ed settled down for the night in the park. 
But a little later, the sprinklers in the park 
erupted and Ed was drenched. Thereupon 
Ed heard the tree tell him that he (the tree) 
was very sorry: trees like to be watered, and 
the tree had not understood that Ed would 
not appreciate a good soaking. Ed accept-
ed the tree’s apology and went on his way 
(2013, p. 118).
Why is it intuitive to attribute dysfunction in Ed’s case, 
but not in the Uduk’s case? In addition to characterizing delu-
sion as a false belief based on incorrect inference that is firmly 
held despite what almost everyone else believes and despite 
being confronted by evidence to the contrary, the DSM’s 
definition continues in the following way: ‘The belief is not 
ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture 
or subculture (i.e., it is not an article of religious faith)’ (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 819). At first glance, this 
cultural exemption clause may appear to be a highly arbitrary, 
relativistic, and unscientific addition. As epistemology does 
not generally regard widespread cultural endorsement as a 
form of justification, this sort of exceptionalism may be dis-
missed as unwarranted and question-begging. 
But the cultural exemption clause in the definition of 
delusion encodes the fact that other causes would be assumed 
rather than dysfunction in the latter case. Uduk people who 
believe that trees can hear conversations are members of a 
culture wherein trees are believed to have counterintuitive bi-
ological characteristics, whereas Ed is not. According to Sam-
uels’ interpretation of cultural exemption, in the case of the 
Uduk the causes of what might seem aberrant behavior for 
outsiders will, on close inspection, have to do with testimony: 
when we acknowledge that the belief that trees have counter-
intuitive biological characteristics is part of the Uduk culture 
and is acquired through testimony, the need to attribute dys-
function vanishes. In short, testimony explains the acquisition 
of strange beliefs. But what about Ed’s case? Should we con-
versely interpret the intuitive pull to attribute dysfunction to 
him as being a result of Ed’s not having the epistemic warrant 
that the Uduk have through testimony? As much as Samuels’ 
observations about testimony make sense of cultural exemp-
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tion in the detection and attribution of mental disorder, the 
converse interpretation in Ed’s case makes the treatment of 
delusions implausible, as lack of testimonial warrant is too 
narrow a rationale to account for our intuitive attribution of 
delusion. For this reason, Murphy (2014, p. 114-115) argues 
that to explain the attribution of delusion we should think 
more broadly about reasoning, going beyond testimony. 
In consonance with Boyer’s cognitive account of detec-
tion and attribution, Ed’s traffic with trees is readily taken 
as evidence of mental dysfunction in the absence of cultural 
exemption. While the description of Ed’s experience is one 
of hallucination, the fact that he accepts this experience as 
true, inferring that trees can talk and letting his behavior 
be guided by this conviction, supports the attribution of an 
accompanying delusion. Murphy (2012, 2013, 2014) applies 
Boyer’s framework to the case of delusion by hypothesizing 
that the psychiatric concept of delusion grows out of a wide-
spread human tendency, which Boyer accounts for via cog-
nitive science, to attribute mental disorder in cases where 
someone’s behavior fails to accord with folk-psychological 
assumptions about how the mind works. More specifically, 
Murphy proposes that our practices of attribution suggest 
that a delusion is a belief that is acquired through a process 
that does not fit our folk theories of belief acquisition—
which he dubs folk epistemology. Unlike the DSM definition, 
then, Murphy suggests that what is crucial to demarcating 
delusion from other kinds of aberrant beliefs is not the end 
product of reasoning but the process by which these beliefs 
are formed. 
What is conceptually basic about delusion is the perver-
sion of normal mechanisms of belief acquisition and revision, 
not just the weird beliefs that one ends up with through that 
perverted changing of one’s mind. “Normal” here does not 
mean “according to our best scientific theory.” It means that 
folk psychology, broadly construed, endorses some avenues 
of belief formation and rejects others. Delusional people are 
people who are hooked up to the world in ways that ... folk 
epistemology says are weird, in the sense of falling outside 
normal human expectations about other people’s psychology. 
The weirdness of the ensuing belief is (defeasible) evidence 
for the abnormality of their reasoning mechanisms, but the 
weirdness itself is not the conceptually crucial element (Mur-
phy, 2014, p. 115).
Thus, what makes delusions distinctive is not that they 
violate epistemic norms, per se. Instead, our folk-epistemolog-
ical expectations are violated. All manner of beliefs that violate 
epistemic norms are part of our folk-epistemological expec-
tations and can be accounted for by our folk-epistemologi-
cal resources which, Murphy (2012, p. 22) elucidates, do not 
just include folk psychology in the narrow sense of theory of 
mind, but also beliefs and expectations about the role of “hot” 
cognition and personal interests in the formation and main-
tenance of belief, as well as the role of culture in shaping peo-
ple’s assumptions about what counts as legitimate evidence. 
In the case of self-deception, for example, though the belief is 
formed and maintained in the face of contradictory evidence, 
we as interpreters do not run out of explanatory resources 
and can readily come up with an explanation of how and 
why the belief came about. In other words, what is distinctive 
about delusion is the “explanatory gap” created by its observa-
tion, and closed by its attribution. 
So how does Murphy’s Boyer-inspired account of de-
lusion attribution impact the status of delusion as a natural 
kind? Unlike biological taxa which, as we have seen, are prime 
examples of property clusters held together by homeostatic 
causal mechanisms, delusion (as well as other psychiatric cat-
egories) appear to be mind- or response-dependent in ways 
that put pressure on even the most liberal sense of natu-
ral-kindhood. 
The first mind-dependence objection one may extract 
from the discussion of the attribution of delusion simply 
states that delusion is not a natural kind because it is an ar-
tifact of our folk psychology. As Murphy claims, ‘whether or 
not something is a delusion is a matter of how it strikes us, and 
that depends on how well it comports with our understand-
ing of what people are like, both in general terms and within 
our culture’ (2006, p. 180). Note, however, that even if we 
follow Samuels and derive such an objection from Murphy’s 
claim that delusion is a matter of how it strikes us, this objec-
tion could not be derived from the mere fact that delusions 
are a part of our folk conception of the world, since there is no 
immediate incompatibility between the naturalness of a kind 
and the fact that it maps onto our folk conceptions. 
As Samuels notes, water is plausibly a natural kind, 
though ‘water’ and the concept it expresses are also part of our 
folk conceptions. Though one may have affinities for elimina-
tivism concerning some of our folk concepts, there is, on the 
other hand, no principled reason to deny that at least some of 
our folk concepts do pick out natural kinds. What the present 
objection hinges on is the premise, attributed by Samuels to 
Murphy, that what it is to be a delusion is determined by how 
it strikes us. That is, the premise that all there is to being a 
delusion is to be a certain kind of response-dependent prop-
erty. As we have seen, Samuels alludes to Page (2006)’s notion 
of individuative independence—the sense in which a class of 
things is circumscribed by boundaries that are totally inde-
pendent of our taxonomic practices—as the relevant sense in 
which natural kinds must be response-independent. So the 
objection at hand can be seen as likening the individuation 
of abnormal psychological conditions into delusions to the 
individuation of the night sky into constellations: just as the 
existence of constellations is parasitic on the way we choose 
to categorize things, so is the existence of delusions. In other 
words, the task for those who wish to argue that delusion is 
a natural kind consists in showing that delusion as a kind is 
more akin to stars than to constellations. 
Samuels’ answer to the response-dependence objection 
consists in arguing that it conflates the metaphysics of delu-
sion with its epistemology: ‘The relevant metaphysical issue 
concerns the nature of delusions: roughly, what is it to be a 
delusion. The relevant epistemic question concerns the evi-
dential basis for our judgements about delusion: roughly, the 
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sorts of evidence we invoke in judging that someone is delud-
ed’ (2009, p. 68-69). Samuels concedes that Murphy gets the 
epistemology of delusion right, and that not only everyday 
judgments about which mental states are delusions are made 
on the basis of commonsense psychological considerations, 
but the judgements of clinicians who diagnose delusions are 
also largely dependent on the same folk conceptions. Samuels’ 
point, then, is that the fact that the detection and attribution 
of delusion is a matter of how it strikes us does not show that 
what it is to be a delusion is exhausted by how things strike us 
and, consequently, there is still a possibility that, in this case, 
our folk conception will be vindicated by, and map onto, a 
scientific understanding of delusion—what Murphy (2014, 
p. 119) aptly calls the vindication project. 
The second mind-dependence objection to which Sam-
uels refers is that which states that delusion is not a natural 
kind because delusion is context-sensitive. In fact, there are 
two senses in which delusion may be said to be culturally rela-
tive. The first sense expands on what has been just discussed, 
namely, the fact that the attribution of delusion derives from 
our folk conception of what is and isn’t a healthy or normal 
state of mind. Whereas the previous objection concerns an 
allegedly universal feature of human folk psychology, a new 
objection may hinge on the claim that the attribution of delu-
sion will also depend on what is considered a healthy or nor-
mal state of mind within one’s cultural context, encoded in 
the cultural exemption clause in the definition of delusion giv-
en in the DSM-5. The clause makes sense of the intuition that 
the delusional individual stands alone in some sense (Leeser 
and O’Donohue, 1999, p. 692). The intuitive character of the 
cultural exemption clause can once again be seen by contem-
plating what we would judge as strange and even irrational 
beliefs which are nevertheless commonplace in cultures other 
than our own. For example, consider the following entry in 
Dan Sperber’s field diary, from the period he conducted eth-
nographic fieldwork among the Dorze people of Southern 
Ethiopia between 1968 and 1974: 
Saturday morning old Filate came to see me 
in a state of great excitement: 
“Three times I came to see you, and you 
weren’t there!”
“I was away in Konso.” 
“I know. I was angry. I was glad. Do you 
want to do something?” 
“What?” 
“Keep quiet! If you do it, God will be 
pleased, the Government will be pleased. 
So?”
“Well, if it is a good thingand if I can do it, 
I shall do it.”
“I have talked to no one about it: will you 
kill it?”
“Kill? Kill what?”
“Its heart is made of gold, it has one horn 
on the nape of its neck. It is golden all over. 
It does not live far, two days’ walk at most. 
If you kill it, you will become a great man!”
And so on… It turns out Filate wants me to 
kill a dragon. He is to come back this after-
noon with someone who has seen it, and 
they will tell me more… (1982, p. 35).
Commenting on this entry, Sperber goes on to express 
respect and affection for his Ethiopian friend. He is confident 
that the man was not senile at the time of the unusual request 
and, moreover, that he was too poor to drink. Consequently, 
Sperber is faced with a variation of a question that, undoubt-
edly, all of us ask ourselves of someone else at some point: how 
could a sound person believe that? ‘That’ being, in this case, 
that dragons exist, not “once upon a time,” but there and then, 
within walking distance. What if Sperber had expressed doubts 
that such an animal even exists? What if he had pressed his 
friend on the issue of the dragon’s heart being made of gold 
and the apparent impossibility of a gold heart beating? Sperber 
concludes that his friend was ‘merely quoting what people who 
had killed these animals were reported to have said, and they 
knew better than any of us’ (1982, p. 61). In line with Sperber’s 
explanation, Samuels (2009, p. 69-70) argues that the cultural 
relativity of delusions tracks precisely the insensitivity of delu-
sions to testimony—an important source of epistemic warrant 
and epistemic defeat. Because it is normal for one to form and 
maintain beliefs based on the testimony of peers and authori-
ties from one’s culture or subculture, resistance to testimony is 
viewed as a sign that something is wrong. And because one’s 
source of testimony varies with one’s culture and subculture, 
the cultural exemption clause is a necessary measure to avoid 
the hasty judgment that culture-bound beliefs are necessarily 
irrational and possibly even the product of pre-rational mental 
processes (Sperber, 1980). However, so long as the resistance to 
testimony that characterizes delusion is culturally invariant, the 
fact that delusions are resistant to testimony does not suffice to 
show that delusion is a response-dependent property and, thus, 
cannot be used to successfully object to the natural kind status 
of delusion. 
The second sense in which delusion may be said to be 
culturally relative derives from the fact that the content of de-
lusions is highly sensitive to social and cultural context. So, for 
example, Masato Tateyama and colleagues (1998) compared 
the schizophrenic delusions of 324 inpatients in Japan, 101 in 
Austria, and 150 in Germany, and found that themes of per-
secutory delusion (i.e., delusions of poisoning) and religious 
themes of guilt/sin were conspicuous in Europe, while amor-
phous delusions of reference (i.e. ‘being slandered’) were pre-
dominant in Japan. Another study conducted by Stompe et al. 
(1999) compared the schizophrenic delusions of 126 Austri-
an and 108 Pakistani patients, finding significantly higher fre-
quencies of grandiose and religious delusions in Austrian pa-
tients, and persecutory delusions with political themes among 
male Pakistani patients. To these observations may be added 
the existence of culture-bound syndromes whose expression 
includes culture-specific symptoms, as in koro, most prev-
alent among Chinese ethnic groups, in which an individual 
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claims that his or her genitals are retracting and will disappear 
(Chowdhury, 1996). 
Time is also a factor. Changes within one and the same 
culture have an impact on the diachronic variability of delu-
sional content, as Škodlar et al. (2008) have found in a study 
of admission records of patients with schizophrenia in Slove-
nia from 1881 to 2000. The recent emergence of the so-called 
Truman Show delusion attests to the same fact—patients 
with ‘Truman signs’ claim that their lives are staged plays or 
reality television shows, as with the protagonist of the 1998 
film The Truman Show (Fusar-Poli et al., 2008; Gold and Gold, 
2012). However, though the kinds of variability discussed 
above may suggest that delusion is response-dependent to 
the extent that what is a delusion depends on what beliefs are 
socially prevalent at a certain point in time, Samuels (2009, 
p. 69) notes that what the sensitivity of delusions to social con-
text shows is only that the nature of delusion, as Karl Jaspers 
(1963 [1913]) long before observed, cannot be characterized, 
but can at best only be classified, in terms of its contents.
The vindication project 
If Boyer and Murphy are correct, then the science of 
delusion is inextricably tied with its intuitive detection. Psy-
chiatric elaborations of folk psychology give rise to the clinical 
concept of delusion, the extension of which is then subdivided 
according to surface features, most prominent among these 
its content (i.e., what it is about). But can delusion, being root-
ed in folk psychology, play the role of regimenting scientific 
inquiry? 
By defending that delusion is a natural kind in the HPC 
sense, Samuels answers positively and wagers that scientific 
psychiatry will vindicate the folk concept of delusion—that 
is, if Samuels is correct, the folk concept of delusion picks out 
a causal signature that, once uncovered, will vindicate the re-
liability of this concept and show that delusion is, in fact, a 
homeostatic property cluster. Once the causal mechanisms 
that make the properties of delusion co-occur are discovered, 
causal classification may result in many current subtypes of 
delusion being excluded from its extension. But because the 
HPC conception of natural kindhood does not mandate that 
natural kinds have category essences or category boundaries, 
it is likely that a mature science of delusion informed by its 
causal mechanisms will not be able to give a simple yes or no 
answer to every question of the form ‘Is X a delusion?’. Of 
more practical importance, however, is the fact that a causal 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms would suffice 
to yield powerful inductive generalizations regarding diagno-
sis, prevention, and management. 
But how does the vindication project fare in view of the 
mind-dependence of the folk concept of delusion? As Sam-
uels notes, this only hurts the chances of delusion being an 
HPC kind if we conflate the metaphysics and epistemology 
of delusion. As we have seen, Samuels argues that attention to 
the fact that our concept of delusion is a part of our folk psy-
chology that has been incorporated into scientific psychology 
and psychiatry is not enough to show that it is not a natural 
kind: the folk-psychological kind may well track an under-
lying natural kind. Samuels (2009, p. 69) notes that, to sup-
port the mind-dependence objection, it would be necessary 
to show that in the case of delusion the metaphysical issues 
about the nature of the kind and the epistemic issues about 
how we know about instances of the kind should be collapsed. 
Showing that the clinical concept is built on folk conceptions 
of normality is not enough. Importantly, however, Samuels 
does not establish that delusion is a natural kind. In fact, he 
could not have established this on the basis of a priori specu-
lation alone, as establishing natural kindhood is ultimately a 
matter of investigating the causal basis of the homeostasis of 
property clusters (assuming the HPC model). Samuels does 
skillfully argue against various objections to the status of de-
lusion as a homeostatic property cluster, some of which I have 
discussed above. In doing so, Samuels establishes something 
very important, namely, that these objections are not suffi-
cient to exclude the possibility that delusion is a natural kind. 
So what we are left with after Samuels’ arguments is that the 
natural kind status of delusion is still an open question, i.e. 
that delusion is possibly a natural kind. 
Although the argument from mind-dependence that 
derives from accepting the application of Boyer’s theory to 
delusion is not enough to rule out the possibility that delu-
sion is a natural kind, it does make Samuels’ thesis implausible 
and gives him the burden of proof. This implausibility can be 
better seen if we compare generic folk kinds and generic sci-
entific kinds. If Samuels is right, delusion would be a generic 
natural kind. Just like the kind metal subsumes many differ-
ent subordinate kinds such as gold, copper, and magnesium, 
delusion will subsume subtypes which would themselves also 
be natural kinds. But Samuels’ optimism regarding the vindi-
cation project is hardly justified by the observation of other 
generic folk concepts and how they relate to their scientific 
counterparts. For instance, what the folk concept of metal 
seemingly picks out is not a causal signature, but, as Murphy 
(2014, p. 121) notes, a variety of properties that directly relate 
to our interests, properties like being shiny, being malleable, 
etc., rather than a chemical element whose atoms readily lose 
electrons to form positive ions, etc. Likewise, the folk concept 
of lily, as Dupré (1981, p. 74) points out, does not accurately 
map onto the biological concept of lily, which includes garlics 
and onions, but is used to refer exclusively to a type of flow-
er. If delusion picks out properties that relate to our interests, 
like being weird to varying degrees, then the burden of proof 
falls squarely on Samuels with respect to the likelihood of vin-
dication. 
Furthermore, as investigation into the causes of delusion 
is still in early stages, accepting the view that delusion con-
stitutes an HPC kind is as much a “black-box” approach as 
Wakefield’s, only more modest in its ambition. I have argued 
that as an ontological commitment, this approach is weak. As 
a methodological commitment, on the other hand—and this is 
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the sense in which Kendler et al. (2011) seem to accept that 
psychiatric categories in general are HPC kinds—there is still 
a case for viewing delusion as a generic natural kind with an 
eye toward progress in scientific psychiatry. Bearing in mind 
that what we are authorized to commit to (ontologically) at 
this moment is that delusion is a practical kind—as this co-
heres both with our knowledge of delusion in the clinic as well 
as with our best theory of detection and attribution of men-
tal disorder (and delusion in particular)—if the possibility of 
natural kindhood is still open, assuming natural kindhood is a 
sound methodology inasmuch as it offers a way toward prog-
ress in causal classification. However, I maintain that this is 
neither the only, nor the best way toward progress. 
Even if the folk concept of metal is not appropriate to 
play the role of regimenting scientific inquiry, chemistry did 
eventually arrive at the natural kind metal and many subspe-
cies of our folk concept of metal, such as gold, silver, copper, 
etc. also turned out to be natural kinds. In this manner, de-
spite delusion being a folk concept not so far mapped onto 
a rigorous scientific concept, many subtypes of delusion al-
ready recognized, such as clear-cut cases of monothematic 
delusions following brain damage (e.g. Capgras, mirrored-self 
misidentification, somatoparaphrenia, etc.), might still turn 
out to be natural kinds which are thrown in with similar con-
ditions that strike us as weird into the set of phenomena de-
scribed folk-psychologically (and clinically) as delusions. Our 
focus should be on uncovering the causal mechanisms under-
lying specific kinds of delusion rather than trying to impose 
a general causal explanation on a ragbag of different abnor-
malities that may or may not actually be of the same kind. 
Thus, I suggest a compromise between Zachar’s earlier work 
and Samuels’ defense of delusion as an HPC kind, drawing 
on Murphy’s observations: delusion, as a kind rooted in folk 
psychology, is probably a practical kind, and it probably does 
not pick out a universal causal signature that makes the whole 
category be a natural kind, but it probably does pick out many 
subspecies which are themselves natural kinds. Hence, delu-
sion is a not a natural kind, but some delusions are. Murphy 
uses weeds and vermin as similar concepts. While weeds and 
vermin are not themselves natural kinds, they are made up of 
natural kinds that can be explained empirically. Furthermore:
Whether something counts as a weed or 
a vermin depends on human interests in a 
way that allows the class to grow over time, 
or vary across projects… Concepts that are 
sensitive to human interests in this way are 
open-ended – things may fall into them 
(or drop out of them) as human interests 
change over time. Folk thinking does not 
determine in advance whether a species is 
a pest, nor does it make scientific investi-
gation of a species of pest into a normative 
endeavor (2006, p. 98-99).
So if the question were ‘Is Capgras delusion a natural 
kind?,’ or ‘Is somatoparaphrenia a natural kind?,’ being that 
these are stable clusters of properties with recognizably ho-
mogeneous neurological causes and which are not the prod-
uct of generic folk intuitions but of rigorous clinical obser-
vation and investigation, the case for their natural kindhood 
would be much stronger and plausible. Thus, I suggest that 
the way to progress in the science of delusion lies in trying 
to vindicate the natural kind status of subspecies of delusions 
through the study of the causal mechanisms that make the 
relevant properties occur homeostatically, and not in trying 
to find a shared causal basis for every phenomena that we 
call delusion assuming beforehand that such a share caus-
al basis is present. After the investigation into the causal 
mechanisms is done with multiple subtypes of delusion, a 
causal account of delusion in general will no doubt progres-
sively suggest itself. But the set of delusion subtypes that will 
be found to share causal mechanisms in the sense that would 
authorize us to abstract from them a generic natural kind 
will be a subset of the set of all delusions—a set the intension 
of which depends on context-dependent folk-psychological 
intuitions and, hence, membership in such a set is tied to 
surface features (symptoms, not causes) detected with the 
tools of folk psychology.
Conclusion
In the preceding sections, I have attempted to elu-
cidate some of the difficulties inherent in trying to claim 
that delusion is a natural kind. After delineating five differ-
ent senses of kindhood and introducing a non-essentialist 
approach to natural kindhood—the HPC model—I have 
drawn on a cognitive model of the intuitive detection and 
attribution of mental disorder and its application to the 
case of delusion to flesh out the fact that the clinical catego-
ry of delusion is rooted in folk-psychological expectations. 
Finally, being that the folk-psychological status of delusion 
does not immediately remove the possibility of this kind 
being vindicated as natural by scientific investigation, I 
have questioned the vindication project and formulated a 
working hypothesis that I claim is both ontologically and 
methodologically more sound. My hypothesis is that along 
with the general category of delusion, some delusions will 
be confined to practical kindhood, perhaps along with the 
bulk of mental symptoms and disorders, while some will 
turn out to be objective distinctions in nature. Important-
ly, this hypothesis and methodological suggestion bypass-
es what Samuels calls the unity problem: if many different 
subtypes of mechanism are responsible for delusions, why 
treat delusions as such as a natural kind? According to him, 
it must be because these mechanisms are themselves of 
the same kind. What I have tried to show in here is that 
assuming that a variety of mechanisms make subtypes of 
delusion subtypes of some general mechanism as opposed 
to a heterogeneous collection of different mechanisms the 
products of which share surface features is not only unwar-
ranted, but methodologically flawed. 
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